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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This

Appeal

is

from

the

Court's

Memorandum

Decision,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment granting
Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court of the

State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal under Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)e(iii).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Director of State Lands upheld an audit and demand for
payment issued by the Division of State Lands.

The Plaintiff

filed a Declaratory Judgment action challenging the Director's
decision.

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment and entered

a Judgment reversing the decision of the

Director.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
(1)

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

entering

Summary

Judgment authorizing depletion of the trust assets for less than
full

value

in

view

of

Federal

and

State

constitutional

law

governing school trust lands?
(2)

Whether

the

plain

language

of

the

lease

may

be

rewritten by the court because one party claims it is ambiguous?
(3)

Whether

Plaintiff

should

be

barred

from

using

the

doctrine of estoppel to avoid paying monies owed to the school
trust fund when it was Plaintiff's duty to report and pay the
correct amount of royalties?

1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Utah Enabling Act, §6:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirtysix in every township of said proposed state, and where
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in
legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter section
and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said
State for the support of common schools....
Utah Enabling Act §10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for
educational purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise
provided, shall constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for the
support of said schools, and such land shall not be
subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for
school purposes only.
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July
16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be
safely invested and held by the State; and the income
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and
maintenance of the different institutions and colleges,
respectively, in accordance with the requirements and
conditions of said Acts of Congress. 91 (Article X was
amended, effective July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming
Sections 5 and 7 ) .
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people,
2

to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
30 U.S.C. §207(a):
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less
than 12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined
by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a
lesser amount in the case of coal recovered by
underground mining operations....
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2:
2.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 12 1/2% of the value of the coal removed from
a surface mine.
3.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 8% of the value of the coal removed from an
underground mine, except that the (Minerals Management
Service) may determine a lesser amount, but in no case
less than 5% if conditions warrant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Division of State Lands audited the payments under
its coal leases on school trust lands.

One of those leases was

held by Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company.

Demand was made

to Plaintiff to pay royalties found by the audit to have been
underpaid. (R.681 P.53)

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the
3

auditors to the Director of the Division of State Lands. (R.683
P.60-61)

The Director, after a hearing, upheld the audit and the

demand for payment. (R.684)

Plaintiff then filed this action in

the Seventh Judicial District Court, asking for a declaration
that the State could not collect the unpaid royalties.

A pre-

trial order was entered which included a list of undisputed facts
and exhibits. (R.660)
Judgment.
Judgment

Both parties filed Motions for Summary

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
finding

that

(Addenda 1, 2 and 3)

Plaintiff

owed

nothing

to

the State.

It is from those Orders that this appeal is

taken.
The parties stipulated to a list of undisputed facts and
exhibits.

Those are set forth in the Pre-trial Order (R.660)

The court based its decision on those facts and exhibits. (R.647,
790, Addenda 1 and 3)

This Statement of The Case will refer to

the number of the paragraph (P) and the page in the Pre-trial
Order which contains the facts relied on by the State.
The

United

States, pursuant

to

the Utah

Enabling Act,

granted lands to the State of Utah to be used for the support of
the common schools.
trustee.

The State of Utah holds that land as

Management of those lands is by the Board of State

Lands and the Division of State Lands. Utah Code Ann. §65-1-14.
On February 8, 1965 Malcolm N. McKinnon, coal lease no.
22603. (Addendum 4, R.664 P.3)

The lease authorizes extraction

of coal from school trust lands located in Emery County, Utah.
4

(R.664 P.5)

The lease is perpetual, as long as coal is produced

in commercial quantities, with a provision for adjustment at the
end of each 20-year period.

The lease was eventually acquired by

the Plaintiff. (R.666, 670 P. 11, 20, 22)
The United States Government owns numerous coal producing
lands within the State of Utah, many of which are in Emery
County.

(R.687,

708-722

P.

70, Schedule

I-IV,

Addendum

5)

Therefore, the royalty charged on federal coal leases generally
becomes the prevailing market royalty rate for coal leases within
the State.1

When State lease no. 22603 was issued by the State,

the royalty rate on many federal coal leases was $.15 per ton.
(R.684, 708-722 P.62, Schedules I-IV, Addendum 5)

The paragraph

(Article III Second) requiring the payment of royalty on the
subject State lease requires Lessees:
To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day
of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of $.15 per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United State at that time,

1

Statement of Guy R. Martin, Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, to the Energy Resources and Materials Production
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources "Oversight Hearing on the Federal Coal Leasing
Program," (June 12, 1980), wherein he testified: "Because the
vast Federal reserves and their locational advantage place the
government in a powerful market position, the Interior Department
will be the price setter for western coal."
5

whichever is higher..•. (Addendum 4)
State lease no. 22603 also requires the Plaintiff to prepare
and forward to the State, each quarter, a certified statement as
to the amount of production together with other information as
required by the State Land Board.

(Article III, Third)

The

State also retained the right to go upon the premises and conduct
audits of the lessees' records. (Article XI)
The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at
$.15 per ton until August 4, 1976.

On August 4, 1976 the Federal

Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 3 0 U.S.C. §§201-209 was
enacted by Congress. (R.684 P.63)

The Act and the regulations

promulgated thereunder, increased the royalty rate on surface
mines to 12 1/2% of the value of the coal produced and the
royalty rate on underground mines to 8% of the value of the coal
produced.

(R.684-685 P. 63, 64)

Between January 1, 1979 and

December 31, 1985 twenty-three (23) coal leases were issued by
the United States Bureau of Land Management on lands within the
State of Utah. Eighteen (18) of those leases required a royalty
payment of 8% of the value of coal.
Addendum 5)

(R. 708-710, Schedule I,

Only one required a royalty rate of less than 8% and

that royalty rate was 5% of the value of the coal.
Upper level management

of the Plaintiff

knew about the

passage of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act of 197 6 and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. (R.686 P.69)

Plaintiff also

held two federal leases which were operated from the same mine as
the State coal lease.

Federal Coal Lease U-082996 was issued on
6

July 1, 1962 and required a royalty rate of $.15 per ton. (R.688
P. 76)

On January

18, 1980

federal coal

lease U082996 was

modified with the addition of second parcel of property.

The

royalty rate of the added property was 8% of value. (R.688 P.78)
On July 1, 1983 federal coal lease U082996 was readjusted and the
royalty rate set at 8% of value for all coal mined from the land
covered by that lease. (R.689 P.80)
also

acquired

Federal

Coal

On March 1, 1983 Plaintiff

Lease

U49332.

That

required a royalty of 8% of value. (R.689 P. 81)

lease also
Effective

January 1, 1986 the State coal lease was adjusted and the royalty
rate on the adjusted State coal lease is 8% of value. (R.664 P.4)
The lands that the Division of State Lands manages has
thousands of mineral leases.

The Division does not have the

funds or the personnel to monitor each lease, or the payments
received on those leases.

Instead the State of Utah, as written

in its lease provisions and regulations, requires its lessees to
accurately provide information and to pay the correct amounts of
royalties. (Addendum 4, R.678 P.42)

Like reporting taxes, it has

largely been an honor reporting system.

In 1981 the Utah State

Legislature appropriated funds for the Division of State Lands to
hire an auditor to review income from its mineral leases. Richard
Mitchell

was hired.

(R.678

P.

43)

He

set up an auditing

procedure and started to audit the State's oil and gas leases.
(R.678 P.43)

In 1984 the Auditing Division was expanded and two

auditors, Douglas E. Johnson and Ralph Aiello were hired. (R.678
7

P. 44)
In December of 1984 the auditors started to review the State
coal leases.
of

Land

The audit included an analysis of the U.S. Bureau

Management

examination

of

records

the

on

Plaintiff's

records. (R.678 P.45)

federal
and

coal

other

leases

State

coal

and

an

lessee

The auditors found that the coal lessees

had, in certain instances, under reported production and failed
to report other vital information.

They also found that the

royalty rate on federal coal leases had increased to 8% beginning
in 1977, but the Plaintiff had failed to report and pay royalties
at the prevailing federal rate. (R.679 P.47, 48)
An audit report was prepared and submitted to the Division
of State Lands. (R.680 P.49)
State

Lands

established

auditors' report.

an

The Director of the Division of
audit

committee

to

review

the

The audit committee reviewed the lease and the

findings of the auditors7 report.

Some adjustments were made to

the audit report and it was approved. (R.680 P.50-52) * The audit
report was then sent to the Plaintiff with a request for payment
of the delinquent royalties together with interest. (R.681 P.53)
The Plaintiff, upon receipt of the audit report, requested a
hearing before the Director of the Division of State Lands. A
hearing was held.

The Director rejected the appeal and upheld

the findings of the auditors. (R.683 P.60-61)

8

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal is from the trial court's grant of a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when the

pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).

This Court

should consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Defendants, Durham vs. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977),
and affirm the decision only if the Court determines there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact and that the
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Holcombe. 740 P.2d

281 at 283

(Utah 1987).

Briggs vs.

This Court, in

reviewing the issues of law, gives no deference to the trial
court.

Atlas Corporation vs. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225

at 229 (Utah 1987).
The

issues

before

the

Plaintiff by the Director

Court have been
of State Lands.

decided

against

The Court, when

reviewing the decision of the Director, should not override the
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and
regulations unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous.

This

Court should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in
excess of his powers in upholding the audit.

McKnight vs. State

Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 at 731 (Utah 1963), Atlantic Richfield
Company vs. Hinkel. 432 F.2d 587 at 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
9

The Defendants agree that the controlling issues in the case
are issues of law.

The Defendants maintain that when the issues

of law are correctly decided they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

Defendants maintain, however, that there are

issues

in

of

fact

dispute

judgment for the Plaintiff.

which

preclude

entry

of

summary

Defendants request that this Court

review the legal issues, that those issues be decided in favor of
Defendants, and that the case be remanded with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

State

of

Utah,

as

a

condition

of

statehood,

acquired certain lands in trust for the benefit of the common
schools.

The State has a Constitutional and moral duty to obtain

full value from the disposition of those lands.

The trial court

placed impermissible restrictions on the trust lands in question
when it restricted the royalty rate the State could collect from
those lands to $.15 per ton rather than allowing the State to
collect the contractually-required market rate of 8% of value of
the coal.
2.

The royalty provision in the coal lease is clear and

should be given its plain meaning.

The requirement that the

Plaintiff periodically determine whether the federal royalty rate
has changed and that it pay royalties on the changed rate does
not create an ambiguity.

Such provisions are common in long-term

leases to insure that the parties pay according to prevailing
10

market terms.

In this case, a fluctuating royalty rate is

constitutionally required to insure that the trust fund receives
full value for its lands.
3.

The Court should use rules of construction to clarify

any ambiguity

in the lease.

The trial court erred when it

rewrote the parties7 lease by limiting royalties to $.15 per ton.
Not even the Plaintiff claims that the royalty rate should always
remain at $.15 per ton.

The lease should be construed to give

meaning to all its provisions including subparagraph (b) of the
royalty provision which provides for increases in the royalty
rate.
4.

Estoppel should not be used by the Court to prevent the

trust fund from receiving full value for its assets.
Enabling

Act

requires

the

trust

to

receive

The Utah

full value and

requires the State to manage the trust fund in its governmental
capacity.

To allow estoppel in this case would violate those

constitutional requirements and would cost the trust fund in
excess of five million dollars.
5.

The Plaintiff has suffered no injury, was aware of the

facts which caused the royalty rate to increase, and had the duty
to pay the correct royalties.

The State is only asking that the

Plaintiff pay what is required by the lease.
should not be estopped.

11

Such a request

ARGUMENT
POINT I. UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE TRUST ASSETS OF THE STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS MAY
NOT BE DEPLETED FOR LESS THAN FULL VALUE.
The State lands which are subject to the coal lease in
question are school trust lands.

The interpretation of the lease

and the other issues that were before the trial court were
subject to rules of law established by the Utah Enabling Act,
Constitutional

provisions

and

case

law.

The

trial

court

erroneously rejected the law governing school trust lands in its
construction of the lease and in its holding that the State was
estopped from obtaining fair market value for its trust lands.
This argument will first set forth a brief historical background
on the purpose and policy of trust lands and will then examine
the

case

law which

the trial

court should have applied in

deciding this case.
A.
The Historical
Perspective.

Background

Provides

Essential

Utah is one of thirty (3 0) public land states whose Enabling
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and
institutions.
1981].

L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed.

In Utah vs. Kleepe. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978) rev'd

on other grounds 446 U.S. 500 (1980) the Court explained the
purpose of the school land grants:
There were no federal lands within the borders of the
original thirteen states when they adopted and ratified
the United States Constitution. Thus, virtually all of
the lands within their borders were subject to
taxation, including taxation necessary for the
12

maintenance of their public; school systems. When other
states were subsequently admitted into the Union, their
territorial confines were "carved" from federal
territories. The "public lands" owned and reserved by
the United States within those territorial confines
were not subject to taxation. This reservation by the
United States created serious impediment to the "public
land" states in relation to an adequate property tax
base necessary to permit these states to operate and
maintain essential government services, including the
public school systems, It was in recognition thereof,
i.e., in order to "equalize" the status of the newly
admitted states with that of the original thirteen
states, that the Congress enacted the federal land
grant statutes. The specific purpose was to create a
binding permanent trust which would generate financial
aid to support the public school systems of the "public
land" states.

The

utj

eac;

- s~z

En**

:

^ J C I ^

* ,r

*

accepted those land.

•.:__.;_.

•

support

common schools,

1

i tah

.1 IL& Consuitut ?n,
; /•;..;:. L^;

which they had been rrr^rrc:-:

respective purposes L^r

' -n.-t r.nzicr

f Utah, Article XX.

B.
The Law Requires The Recei^- _,.r -„-_.,,,_ ,a.^e . Jim
The Disposition Of Trust Lands.
The school land grants

,.

. .

-

the United States and the St,.::- of T;~. \n

.• < ^

. *.n

There has been imposed

upo 1: 1 the S tate o f Utah 1
[a] binding and perpetual obligation to use the granted
lands for the support of public education. All revenue
from the sale or lease of the school grants was
impressed with a trust in favor of the public schools.
No State could divert school lands to other public
purposes without compensating the trust for the full
market value of the interest taken.
Andrus vs. T'tah, 446 U.S. 500, 523-524, 64 L.Ed.2d 458, 474, 100
13

Sup. Ct. 1803 (1981).
Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University
vs. State of Indianaf 55 U.S. 268, 274 (1852) the Supreme Court
of the United States has consistently held that a State holds
school lands in trust for the benefit of its schools.

Congress

and the Courts have placed restrictions on the use of the trust
lands so that they are not exploited for private advantage or
depleted by State action or inaction.
U.S.

Lassen vs. Arizona, 385

458, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 L.Ed.2d 515, 522

(1967).

(While

Lassen dealt with surface rights, recent cases make it clear that
these restrictions also apply to mineral interests located on
school trust lands.

Jensen vs. Dinehart, 645 P. 2d 32, 35 (Utah

1982), Alamo Land and Cattle Company vs. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295,
96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1976).
The duty of the State, in managing mineral rights on trust
lands, is to obtain full value for the trust assets:
The royalty rate set by the state is important because
it represents payment for a trust asset which will be
gone forever once the mineral is removed from the
ground.
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling
Act and the trust concept are the most important
factors to consider in determining an optimum royalty
rate.
If the rate is too low the state will be
committing a breach of trust by diminishing the trust.
Royalty payments are placed in a permanent trust fund,
the corpus of which is invested; the trust is kept
whole if fair market value is received. If the royalty
rate is too low the trust will not be kept whole.
3 State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, Public
Land Law Review, 119, 130 (1982).

See also Kadish vs. Arizona

State Land Department, 747 P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987).
14

State

v s . Kleepe, supra at 7 5 8 ; State v s . University of Alaska, * ? A
P.2d 8 0 7 , 813 (Alaska 1 9 8 1 ) .
To

enforce

consIstently

Llu».

unpui t a n l

rejected

any

luisl

State

(ini|pujM ,

lllln1

statutes,

i uiii I !..

In in n

constitutional

prov i s Lons an: id Coi lr t: : " ;ed dc <::txi nes which restric • t:* •.? state
from obtaining full

.*...* from t h e trust lands,

Arizona

Department,

State

Land

supra,

T

r Radish v s .

t h e Supreme

Court

of

fixed a
flat royalty rate for mi nera] leases on state school trust lands.
The court noted that federal law is supreme in this field and
that:
[n] either thi s court, nor the legislature, n o r t h e
p e o p l e m a y alter or amend t h e trust provisions
contained in t h e Enabling A c t without congressional
approval,

severely ci.^cumscrir:
the assets

v..o ; ,-

of the common

school

: s*;*:,

government t : f..-ci. *.r/i

fund.

It analyzed the court

cases dealinq with thi.i subject and pointed out that:
[t]he courts have consistently construed t h e scope o f
federal land grants in favor of t h e government.
In
dealing with trust land ... all doubts m u s t b e resolved
in favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes.
LA

The primary case discussing t h e Utah Enabling A c t I s State
of Utah v s . Kleepe, supra.
- ^j

1 ; -*

had

ic

:l
.•

eceived pursuant * . :

^

-.

,

,,**••».

« -

,;:.*;: : .-.. •

^.rp'-. "in

- •-

i e

.

:•. •

after

reviewing the Utah Enabling Act and the historical development of
trust lands, stated:
The school land grant and its acceptance by the state
constitutes a solemn compact between the United States
and the state for the benefit of the state's public
school system.
Id. at 758.
Recent

cases

from

other

jurisdictions

have

consistently

rejected attempts to limit the income received by the school
trust.

In Anderson vs. Board of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb.

1977) the Nebraska Supreme Court approved the resale of school
trust property after a higher upset bid was received after the
first sale.

It stated that the constitution:

imposes on the Board the duty of obtaining the highest
price possible for all trust property it may sell.
Id. at 321.
In Oklahoma Education Association vs. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230
(Ok. 1981) the Supreme

Court of Oklahoma struck down a law

authorizing low-interest loans to farmers from the funds of the
school trust fund.

In doing so the court said:

No disposition of such lands or funds can be made that
conflict either with the terms and purposes of the
grant in the Enabling Act or the provisions of the
Constitution relating to such land and funds.
The
State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage
the trust estate for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiaries, and return full value from the use and
disposition of the trust property.
Id. at 235.
In County of Skamania vs. Washington, 685 P.2d 576, 582
(Wash. 1984) a state statute which allowed purchasers of timber
16

from trust lands to default so as to avoid

insolvency due t ::: • e L

drop in timber sales w a s held unconstitutional.
Alamo Lariu. i.« . ..-_i.-_:_^s£ L .U.^«it.

, * ~ _ , _. - ^ ^ i i ^

3 05 (1976), the federal government .. ondemned schoc, \ . - * lands
inn I ucii r " sections leased
validity

of =* school

•

i , .„

> *' * r. , , . :

Commenting c

ieasehc.

value, the

.rt considered <\ t.rotect.i v-> iTc.visio:, container; in

the Mew " -

(-z\

i n i t i^'.

:iSi * . TIC

•
.

*..--*•":*- the
.edbii

l-;ild..v

United States Supreme Court h^\
was for- a r^r

*• h^

;*

*•• *

. * - :J - , 1 d I. I .i .

-, • -r>- lease

*

: r.

-* 3

- lands
r

:

value, the ::^se was veil.
T

"

Plaintxi.1 ,
subjec- * ^

-- —larged with knowledge
:r

*

v s . Lamacus,

Seward,

. :;u^

cue':- a ~ the
,K: •:

obtain full value for the trust.

v s . Phil 1 ips Pe trol ~ State

i*- i-16 3,

ji-o
State

-_^i*-.

.

*

'

*

133 NW, 2d

°->^

State

Seidel v s .
v s . Board of
I-.

Educational Lands and Funds i _ Nebraska,

1954) and Department of State Lands v s . Pettibone. 702 P.2d -le,
9H.7 (Mont , I 'ill!.)
C.
Trust Land Law And Policy Should Be Applied To T h e
Facts Of This Case.
The Stat- of Uv r* has thp duty to receive full market value
from.

+

roy a 1 *

-

ispositio*

-*
.

* * • :hool

trust

lands

'Vlw market

. 11 o : J L a L e o i; U t a 1 i, i s c o n 1t' < i ,1 1 e d

by

the

United

reserves.

States

Lessees

capital

which

has

require

expenditures

the vast

long-term

involved.

majority

leases

It

of coal

because

would

have

of the
been

an

impermissible restriction on the trust assets if the State would
have set a flat $.15 per ton royalty on its long term coal
leases.

Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department, supra at 1195.

It is equally impermissible for the court to judicially set the
royalty rate at a flat $.15 per ton.

The State therefore,

drafted an escalator clause in its coal lease which tied the
royalty provision to the prevailing federal rate.

That escalator

clause insured that the State would, throughout the term of the
lease, receive full market value.
The
provide
payments.
receives

State
for

also

implemented

interest
Those

full

and

penalties

provisions

market

rules

value;

further

and
on

regulations which
delinquent

insure

otherwise,

the

depleted as a result of the time value of money.

that
trust

royalty

the

trust

would

be

Biork vs. April

Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977).
The

Plaintiff,

as

a

party

dealing

with

the trust and

pursuant to the terms of the lease, had the duty to pay the
correct amount of royalty.

When an audit was performed by the

State it showed that the Plaintiff owed to the trust fund over
five million dollars.

The trial court, by refusing to enforce

the escalator provision of the lease, by refusing to require the
payment of interest on delinquent royalties, and by amending the
18

lease *

.:

imp

*

this

cjie,

mil]

*~

C .;

i r per

royalties
'
t

^]

. .

t.i-'

'*rs

t r ' iiposed

Uie i r u b c
*s.. -.-*

* i>

''"^d,

*>ntract

r *

"h -* d e c i s i o n

»«= ^

create;::

constitutionally

*. . . . •"
by

l

*

in

ovpr

:

ive

r\ . * runs

_

tie

i.

Thur

*

v,

J : u n bei' >.
i contract

*

whic^

ar.^m x. JUS

violates

pos.i.-i

"the general! -

doctrine ?* +-^1^ country 4«,. every contrar
is vcii,"
(^

-

491

Baker vs. Latses, 6 3 Utah
.-. -

L-1,.

-_—L_ /

:iw-I^^^^

contra_

.

* - . ., :^-

,

-ccepted
•/

. 2d -

___!_

. - - processes where

A

laving

„

~*

icldir. J * -id as against public \

pay fees f~- c -r n .ce

.

^
v

*" ~

555
DO

P.

- onLract to

* — e ^ s< *
t

: the
^,se-

Payette Lumber Company vs. Challis Independent School District,
No, 1 of Custer Count> , 46 Icl. 103 , 268 P. 26 (19 2 8) (ho 1 dir.q rhat
judicial determinations of public policy must recognize a*. , ^..d
to any appl icable legislate
The. I nr.taint
trial

court

with

IM

In

instructions

enforced and that the trust
prevailing market

enactments).

t it M nil

r^'/^r • HI1 and fpmandpii In the
that

the escalator

clause

be

fund receive royalty rates at* the
nl tin

together with interest as provided by the regulations.

'moved

POINT II. THE ESCALATION CLAUSE RELATING TO ROYALTIES
IS CLEAR; THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
DETERMINE THE PREVAILING FEDERAL ROYALTY RATE DOES NOT
MAKE THE CLAUSE AMBIGUOUS.
The Court, as a matter of law, is to give the provisions of
a contract their plain meaning as ascertained from the instrument
itself.

The Court should look to the entire instrument and give

meaning to all provisions.

Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P.2d

1060 at 1061 (Utah 1981).

The trial court erred when it ignored

the plain meaning of the royalty provision and the intent of the
parties when entering into the contract and rewrote the lease
deleting the escalator provision of the royalty clause.
A reading of the royalty provision in the lease (Article III
Second) shows that it is clear and complies with the intent of
the parties that the trust lands receive the going royalty rate.
It states that the royalty rate will be $.15 per ton (which was
the federal rate when the lease was signed) or if the prevailing
federal rate increases on similar lands then the royalty rate
increases to that new rate.
under

the

misconception

The trial court, apparently, was

that

because

the

escalator

clause

required the Plaintiff to determine the prevailing rate from
facts outside the lease that somehow an ambiguity was created.
Such a provision is not defective if there is a formula or method
to set the price.

Ferris vs. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 359 (Utah

1979).
Escalator clauses in long-term mineral leases are common
provisions.

Almost all escalator clauses or "favored nation"
20

clauses require the parties to ascertain a fluctuating rate from
facts

c iu 1.1 > 11

1 ease,

See e. q , Energy Reserves

Group, Inc. , vs. Kansas Power and Light Company, 459 U, S . 400,
417

(198 3) ,

Amoco

Production

Company

vs.

Stauffer

-Qlii-.^r^.- 1*3.

Company of Wyominu
Company vs. The Howard
1
:v,-

,cuse

Corporation.

-: -

^ .*

- , ui facts oucsiue tne ie^** ^

—--rta

effect

Chemical

pi^v.sions,

does

-

nnt- rrpat-.

~6

7x.

r

nto

a."x'iv.

Instead, sv-": provisions are drafted t. insure that rates, i.uch
a.

: . .

**-- *

protecting both p-v:^

iurir. 7

:;e r :*

The rrTT"*"'tv ^ r ^ ** I T . ccn^^ine-i
formul . ^

. ....

.

srates

F. :-*"'••

i -, determ in«-:" 1 by fiu

similar

character

government,
thij Inderal

the

r-v airy

under

^y

-^ trie lease.

iv the c'~ntr~4«o~ c '*v :- ~ a
.

provision

of

that

c^4.'.

-

(b1

Subsection

payment

to he paid

^

the

by

the

prevailing federal rate on lands

cual

leases

issued by the

tederal

Plaintiff has tiht*» duty to determine any change in
r jyditv

r. die

i!«t

Kede^a1

Coa ] Leasinq A111 ^dments

Act of 1976 increased the royalty rate to 8% of the value of the
coal produced

on

federal

coal

leases.

The federal

owns the ma j or i ty c 1; co..i 1 r etju 1 ves 111 U lah.

UHILL

government
± j / j , J,1 . I1 , '

coal leases issued t, tr.- federal government in the State require
.'* •

•

*

.ue.

Tne federal government has

aij;. adjusr

; rr.ar/

rate u

^,.,v>; — , Schedules I-IV, Addendum b)

i„

; ,;.o L^a^as thereby increasing the royalty
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Those facts,

applied to the royalty provision requires that a royalty rate of
8% of value be paid to the trust fund.
The plain meaning of the provision is that the royalty rate
to be paid by the Plaintiff would change when the federal royalty
rate

increased.

Plaintiff

does not argue that $.15

is the

prevailing federal rate for federal leases of land of similar
character and concedes that the federal rate is higher than the
royalty payment they paid prior to 1976.

Plaintiff, to avoid

paying the correct royalty, instead tries to claim the lease is
ambiguous.

A reading of the plain language of the lease, coupled

with the law governing trust lands, and the change in federal
royalty rates supports only one construction of the lease.

That

construction is that the prevailing federal rate on underground
coal leases has increased to 8% of value and that Plaintiff must
pay royalties at that rate to provide full value to the trust.

22

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED THE LAW
REGARDING TRUST LANDS, THE ESCALATOR PROVISIONS OF THE
LEASE, AND THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AND IMPOSED A FLAT
$.15 PER TON ROYALTY RATE.
A.
Any Ambiguous p r o v i s io n should Be Resolved By
Rules Of Construction Instead Of Being Deleted From The
Lease.
If ''

'*• 'i'^ ermines ther^ : "* .~ '-rr:--:;;*

~ * ::& lease

then the C O u ^ ^iwuid apply ceria... _±.:-L, . : . ;_ ire ./cion to
interpret r *no t del I- are:

*>.- ambiguous t revision.

, ir;.;
*

the

*

intent

conti • • .

"'* =-

:.e ^'ou: - should
•

o f the parties when

- ' icti on

entering

into the

contract controls the meaning of the contract, Utah Valley Bank
vs.

Tanner, supra at 1061; (2) existing 1 aw whi ch affec ts the

provision is considered part of tt le contract and governs its
constructioi i, .Robinson vs . Joint School District, 596 P. 2d 4 36,
438

(Ida. 1 9 79),

Farmers

Investment

Company

vs. Pima Mining

Company, 523 P., 2d 437, 489 (Az. 197 1) ; (3) consideration should
be

g iv e n

contract

t < :>

11 ie

t; u b j e c t

and t h e m o t i v e s

Fontainbleu,

-IMS P M

in a t t e i , i I a 11 i r e
of t h e p a r t i e s ,

M/,, 348 (Utah

'-

a i id
Nagle

p u rp o s e

:cntracc
-

"imp

it w a s signed, D e B o u i s v s . N i g h , 584 P. 2d ^ 3 3 , £.- V~ ,r.
(' ) \ lv

cc: i ii t si: ioi :i ] I :j:I,; re th< = enti i : e

ignore any

of the provisions of the contract ^

: -

c ;
ana not

:e^r:fo the

contract; Hal Taylor Associates vs. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d
74 3,

; 19 (Utah 1:932) a t id (6) 1 :1 le • ::•< a itr a c t in isl : 1: >e

i mi n

liberally to protect the public interest, Public Service Company
23

1: h e

v s . Club

•

should b e viewed from t h e perspective o~ * ,:o j^r-.^.

of

vs.

Denver,

387

P.2d

33,

36

(Colo.

1963),

Restatement

of

Contracts 2d §207.
If these rules of construction are applied to the royalty
provision, the interpretation given by the State is the correct
and reasonable one.

The State, as trustee, is required to have a

royalty provision which provides a maximum value to the trust
fund.

A royalty rate that would fluctuate as market conditions

changed was required.

To have set a flat royalty rate would have

been unconstitutional.
supra at 1195.

Kadish vs. Arizona State Land Department,

The Federal Government owns the majority of coal

reserves in the State of Utah and therefore, the royalty rate
charged by the Federal
market rate

Government constitutes the prevailing

in the State of Utah.

At the time the lease

provision was drafted the federal royalty rate was generally $.15
per ton.

The royalty provision, therefore, was drafted setting a

minimum royalty of $.15
clause

tied

to

the

per ton, but providing an escalator

prevailing

federal

royalty

rate.

The

escalator clause was required by law and the obvious intent of
the parties, when the contract was entered into, was to provide a
mechanism whereby the State would always receive the going market
royalty

rate

from

its

trust

lands.

When

one

ties

that

information and construction, to the undisputed facts it shows
that the federal royalty rate remained at $.15 per ton until
1976.

At that time the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act was

passed and as a result the royalty rate on federal leases was
24

increased to 8%. The undisputed facts show that from 19 ; 9 to the
leases ^ " tah, except for c: ne,

present ail newly issi ^ * federc
were at t he r. i \ \ » of 8

-

Je t o r u I: Stc t:e I ands

•

properly construed the lease t

require payment of royalties at

8%.
B.
The Plaintiffs Have Never Contended That The
Royalty Should Always Remain At $.15 Per Ton.
One

of the things

that

is certain

about

the

royalty

provision, in addition t- :> the pla: r n e m i n g of Subsection :

is

that, the con tracting parties ii I ter ^

.Id

-...!.-

change if federal royalty rates increased.

The Piaintirf argues

that t: 1 ie C• i)i irt shoi :i ] d ] ook at pa-" practices of -.no parries to
determine

the meaning

of the royalty

provision.

The past

practices of the parties are of no benefit at all in construing
t.

., .

practi/r

,. • / :;
c

*/>:- parties,

Si::- s^ :~ar,

- "t

o: paying

nothing

T

:

surely must also fc- -;;ven *>fra^\.
to give effect t

-

J;

tne rare

speciriec

W . U I Subparagraph

- *der
'^ich

\i r.e contract niii:- - ;.>e constr ued

or :v is ions.

Hal Taylor Associates v s .

Union America, 1 __.

=ilL.:

Plaintiff's claim :

: nterpr^ _at.ion o* \: * r^ya.rv provision is

"

"

rouiem

with

that it ignores Subparagraph b. That is not interpretation, that
IS

i-.ii-;1.1 e c t :

-,.'•'"•

Plaint.fr does n :z argue that $.15 Is the prevailing federal
ra

te

£ o r f e c j e r a x leases on laiid of similar character under . TKII

leases issued by the United states during the time period (.overcd
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by the audit.

Its silence concedes that the rate is something

higher than $.15.

However, because they do not like the higher

rate, Plaintiff claims ambiguity and that it should be allowed to
continue to pay at $.15 per ton as provided under Subparagraph a.
This has nothing to do with the intent of either party at the
time of the execution of the lease.

Indeed, that so called

interpretation flatly contradicts the parties' intent at the time
it was signed.

In this particular case the undisputed facts

establish that the prevailing federal rate is 8% of value.

Any

changes in the rate can be easily determined by review of Bureau
of Land Management records.
C.
State Statutes Prohibit The Amending Of The Lease
Without The Land Board's Approval.
There is a difference between construing a provision and
ignoring it.

To ignore and not enforce Subparagraph b of the

royalty provision of the lease constitutes a rewriting of the
terms

of

the

lease

without

the

necessary

approval

Director, the Land Board or the Attorney General.
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).

of

Morgan vs.
Utah Code

Ann. §65-1-76 requires:
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such
board be approved as to form by the attorney general.
§65-1-23 Utah Code Ann., requires:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land
Board shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form
of application, the form of lease, the annual rental,
the amount of royalty and the basis upon which the
royalty shall be computed, and such other details as it
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the

may deem necessary in the interest of the state.
The

trial

court

should

rewrite the parties7 lease.

not be

allowed

to

unilaterally

If there is an ambiguity, the trial

court should be directed to apply proper rules of construction to
clarify the ambiguity and give meaning to all of the royalty
provisions.
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POINT IV,

ESTOPPEL IS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS CASE.

The traditional rule is that the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be asserted

against a state government

in matters

affecting

public policy, public revenues or when the state is acting in its
governmental capacity.

Estoppel is not applied in matters where

an action is prohibited by a state statute or is the result of
unauthorized acts of its officials.

Atlantic Richfield Company

vs. Hinkel. 432 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1970).
There

are

many

good

reasons

for

this

rule

including

safeguarding public funds and interests which are subject to
changes in political opinions and changes in public officials and
employees.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d

715, 718 (Utah 1982).

Restrictions on the application of legal

doctrines when public lands are involved is common such as in the
area

of

eminent domain, Utah

possession.

Code Ann.

§78-34-3

or adverse

There are even greater restrictions and protections

when trust funds and trust lands are involved because of the
constitutional requirements and important policies.
The trial court's ruling that the State was estopped from
enforcing the royalty provisions of the lease was wrong for the
following reasons: (a) the important policies and law governing
trust lands prohibits the use of estoppel when the doctrine is
used to diminish the income received by the trust fund; (b) the
State acts in its governmental capacity when managing trust lands
and, therefore, is subject to estoppel in only limited
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circumstances;

and (c) the undisputed facts will not support a

finding of estoppel.
A.
The Important Policy Of Receiving Full Value For
The Trust Fund Prohibits The Use Of Estoppel,
The trial court erred when it concluded that Defendants were
estopped, as a matter of law, from enforcing the terms of the
lease and obtaining full value for the trust fund.

Courts which

have considered whether estoppel should be applied when it would
reduce the income to school trust lands have consistently held
that the important public policy of providing full value to the
trust

lands

prohibits

the

imposition

of

a defense

such as

estoppel.
In State vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok.
1953) the clerk for the State failed to reserve minerals when
issuing a certificate
allowing
rights

reformation

of purchase for land.
of

the documents

to the State, held

that the

The Court, in

restoring
State was

the mineral
acting

in a

governmental capacity and that it would be a violation of the
State's

trust

responsibilities

mineral rights.

to

allow

divestiture

of

the

Furthermore, the court said that the purchaser

is charged with notice that the State is acting as a trustee and
is

charged

with

notice

that

the

State

could

only

act

in

compliance with rules and regulations of its position as trustee.
The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to
those acts which were beyond the authority of the State employee
when he issued the deed and failed to reserve the mineral rights.
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Id, at 1199.

The State employee in this case had no authority,

either intentionally or accidentally, to set a royalty rate lower
than the prevailing federal rate.
In State vs. Northwest Magnesite Company,

182 P.2d

643

(Wash. 1947) the Commissioner of public lands promised the lessee
of school trust lands that the lessee could remit royalties on
the basis of net profits.

That representation was contrary to

the statute and the lease.

The Court, in holding that the lessee

was required to pay royalties in accordance with the terms of the
lease, held that the State was acting in a governmental capacity,
that estoppel could not be used to enforce the promise of the
Commissioner of Public Lands, that Defendants payment of money
did not constitute an estoppel, and that the State was entitled
to interest on the unpaid royalties.

Id. at 662.

In the case of Department of State Lands vs. Pettibone, 702
P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985), Defendants claimed that they were entitled
to

certain water

rights.

The Montana

Supreme Court denied

Defendants' claim and found that the water rights were part of
the school trust lands of the State of Montana.

The Court held

that there were three important principals governing school trust
lands.

Those principals were: (1) the Enabling Act created a

trust which the State could not violate; (2) the Enabling Act was
to be strictly construed according to fiduciary principles; and
(3) the Enabling Act pre-empted State laws and constitutions.

It

further held that Courts are to be very protective of the trust
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and emphatic of the need to preserve the value of the trust
corpus.

The Court also found that an interest in State land

cannot be conveyed without adequate compensation and that any use
or management which would devalue State lands is impermissible.
It said that anyone who acquires an interest in trust lands does
so subject to the trust and that trust lands are subject to a
different set of rules than other public lands. Id. at 956.
The holdings in the above cases are consistent with the
manner in which this Court has decided issues involving estoppel
against the State.

The general rule in Utah is that an estoppel

cannot be applied against the State if to do so would violate
State statute.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company,

supra at 719.

In the case at hand, the application of an

estoppel would be a violation of both State statutes and the
Constitution of Utah.

Even if the Court determines that estoppel

could apply, the Plaintiff must prove that estoppel is necessary
to prevent manifest injustice and the public interest would not
be unduly damaged by imposing the defense. Utah State University
vs. Sutro and Company, 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982), Celebrity
Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694
(Utah 1979).

In Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company the

Court stated:
[t]he rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel
against the government is sound and generally should be
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as
hereinabove stated, where the interest of justice
mandates an exception to the general rule. In cases
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is
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whether it appears that the facts may be found with
sufficient certainty, and the injustice to be suffered
is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.
Id., at 720.
The essential policy and public interest in trust land cases
is the requirement that the trust fund receive full value for its
assets.

To allow the application of estoppel in this case would

defeat that purpose.

As pointed out in Utah State University vs.

Sutro and Company and Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. Utah Liquor
Control Commission the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied
when it would violate such an important public purpose.

See

also. Western Kane County Service District vs. Jackson Cattle
Company, 744 P.2d

1376, 1378

based on estoppel and stating

(Utah 1987) (reversing a ruling
ff

[w]e are extremely reluctant to

apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in
a public highway by a governmental entity").
In addition, there is no manifest injustice involved.

An

assertion of manifest injustice requires the Plaintiff to prove
with certainty that paying royalties at $.15 per ton is a higher
purpose than that of the trust fund receiving full value for its
assets.
718.

Utah State University vs. Sutro and Company, supra at

The injustice in this case is the trial courts application

of estoppel giving the Plaintiff a windfall at the expense of the
school trust fund.
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B.
Estoppel Is Applicable Only In Very
Circumstances When The State Is Acting
Governmental Capacity.

Limited
In Its

The question of whether the State of Utah acted in its
governmental or proprietary capacity when managing school trust
lands was considered by the Utah Supreme Court in Duchesne County
vs. State Tax Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943).

This Court

held:
Here the trusteeship of the fund was vested in the
State by the Enabling Act as a condition of statehood,
as a condition to the right of the State to be born,
and imposed upon the State at its birth by the
instrument of its creation as a condition of its life
as a government.
It must therefore be held by the
state in a governmental capacity.
Id., at 343.
This ruling is in line with rulings in other states which
have considered the issue as well as the present case law of the
State

of

Utah

regarding

the distinction

functions, and governmental
retains its immunity.

between

proprietary

functions as to which the State

A governmental function has been defined

as a function which is performed only by a government entity and
is essential to the core of governmental activity.

Cox vs. Utah

Land and Mortgage Corporation. 716 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986),
Metropolitan Financial Company vs. State, 714 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah
19 86) .
definition

The
to

Utah

Legislature

include

governmental activities.

has

non-essential

recently

expanded

as

as

well

that

essential

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a).

The

management of school trust lands is an obligation imposed upon
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the

State

by

Constitution,

a

federal

statute

and

accepted

by

the

Utah

It is an activity that can only be performed by

the State.
As

already

established,

the

Court

must

be

extremely

reluctant to apply estoppel when the State is acting in its
governmental capacity.

When public lands are involved, still

more restrictive rules govern.

For example, adverse possession

cannot be applied against public lands.
P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1934).

Peterson vs. Johnson, 34

Great protection is given to trust

lands because doctrines such as estoppel or adverse possession
defeat constitutional requirements to receive full value for the
trust and violate the State's governmental powers.

Department of

State Lands vs. Pettibone, supra at 952.
It is hard to imagine any other act of the State which would
be more governmental in nature than the trust responsibilities
imposed by the Enabling Act and accepted by the State in its
Constitution and as a requirement to obtain statehood.

Estoppel

cannot be used to prevent the State from functioning in this
important government capacity.
C.
Estoppel Would Prohibit The State From Correcting
Errors Found Through The Audit Process.
The audit, by the State, of Plaintiff's records showed that
in addition to under-reporting the royalty rate Plaintiff also
did not report the production of 41,433 tons. (R.798)

Plaintiff

does not claim the State is estopped from collecting for that
production even though the State accepted, without objection
34

inaccurate

quarterly

reports

and

payments

for

the

quarter

involved.

Where is the line between what Plaintiff claims in

subject to estoppel and that which is not subject to estoppel?
One of the problems with asserting the doctrine of estoppel,
in a case such as this, is that it is of no value for the State
to audit its lessees.

When the Plaintiff, or any other lessee,

holding a State lease reports an incorrect royalty rate, an
incorrect sales price,, an incorrect volume of coal produced or
any other factor going into the calculation of the royalty those
errors are only discovered when an audit is made.

If the State

has to make an audit each time a payment comes in and determine
immediately, the accuracy of each report, the public interest
will be severely damaged.

It is impossible for the State to

audit each report when it is received.
the

State

requires

royalties.

Therefore, the lease and

the lessee to accurately

report and pay

The State then conducts periodic audits to insure

compliance.
D.
The Undisputed Facts Do Not Supnort A Finding Of
Estoppel.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the State was
estopped

from

collecting

delinquent

royalty

payments.

Its

finding that the Plaintiff has relied on the State's lack of
protest, and had mined the coal in reliance upon a royalty rate
of $.15 per ton was wrong.
detriment

could

correctly

Defendants. (R.734)

The facts upon which reliance and
be

founded

were

disputed

by

the

Indeed, the undisputed facts showed that it
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was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to pay the correct
royalty amount. (R.678 P.42)

The Plaintiff has the duty to the

State to calculate and pay the correct royalty. (Lease No. 22603,
Article III Third)

The State did not have a duty to Plaintiff to

collect the correct royalty although it has such a duty to the
school trust.
If the doctrine of estoppel were applicable in this case the
Plaintiff must prove: (1) a false representation or concealment
of a material fact; (2) made with knowledge of the facts; (3)
made to a party without knowledge or the means of knowledge of
the

real

facts;

(4)

made

with

the

intention

that

the

representation be acted upon; and (5) the parties to whom the
representation was made, relied or acted upon is injured.

Colman

vs. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah 1987).
One is not entitled to rely on erroneous or unauthorized
statements of a government employee.

Dansie vs. Murray City, 560

P.2d 1123 at 1124 (Utah 1977), Atlantic Richfield vs. Hinkel,
supra at 591.

If a person has the means to determine the actual

facts estoppel does not apply.
supra.

To claim estoppel against the government, the injury must

be substantial.
injury.
PSC,

Morgan vs. Board of State Lands,

Paying what is owed under the lease is not an

Barnes vs. Woodf 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1988); Williams vs.

754

P.2d

41

(Utah

1988);

and

Utah

Department

of

Transportation vs. Reagan, 751 P.2d 270 (Utah 1988).
The undisputed facts will not support a finding of estoppel.
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It was the Plaintiff who was responsible to correctly report the
royalty rate and payments. (R.275 P.34)

It was the Plaintiff who

had substantial dealings with the federal government and who was
aware of the increase in the federal royalty rate (R.686, 688
P.69, 75-82) and it was the State that relied on the Plaintiff to
accurately report and accurately pay the correct royalty amount.
(R.678 P.42)

The undisputed facts support a finding of estoppel

against the Plaintiff and not in favor of the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claimed that estoppel should be applied because
the State failed to notify Plaintiff of the higher royalty rate.
Silence by the State will not support estoppel, especially when
the

State

Plaintiff.

did

not

know

the

facts

but

was

relying

on the

Plaintiff also claimed that it would be unjust to

require it to pay the additional royalties.

The Plaintiff paid

the federal government royalties at 8%. (R. 29 P.78-81)

It paid

an overriding royalty of 8% to a previous owner of the State
lease.

Most important the sales price for Plaintiff's coal was

based on Plaintiff paying an 8% royalty. (R.739, 756 which are
Exhibits 89 and 90 from the Pre-trial Order)

Plaintiff achieves

a windfall by selling coal at a price which assumes it is paying
an 8% royalty to the State and then Plaintiff only pays the State
$.15 per ton.

Plaintiff has already received from its customers

the monies the State seeks to collect. (R.700, Exhibits 89 and 90
to Pre-trial Order, 739 at 746, 756 at 763)

Plaintiff will only

be required to pay what the lease requires.
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Such does not

constitute injury or injustice.
vs. PSC, supra.

Barnes vs. Wood, supra, Williams

If this Court determines that the doctrine of

estoppel could apply in this case, then the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for trial with Plaintiff having the
burden to prove it has met the elements required for estoppel.
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CONCLUSION
The law requires that the State of Utah receive a maximum
return on its disposition of school trust lands.

The State

implemented that requirement by linking the royalty rate on the
lease to the prevailing federal royalty rate.

The decision of

the trial court imposes improper restrictions on the trust lands.
The State asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial
court and remand the case with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the State of Utah upholding the decision of the Director
of State Lands.
Respectfully submitted this

day of^September, 1988.

NIELSEN/S SENIOR

Attorneys/for Appellant

By; A h ^ S U X t \ J l A h j A j w j J t
Gayle 1^ McKeachnie
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ADDENDUM

Addendum /

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH MILES,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847

Defendants.
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial summary
judgment and has supported the same by the stipulated facts as
set forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and other supporting
affidavits, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points
and Authorities.

The defendants have objected to the Motion and

have filed their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
have submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities.
The defendants have objected to the publication of
certain depositions requested by the plaintiff and referred to
by the plaintiff in their Memorandum.

The Court finds that the

Motion is well taken and will not order publication of the
depositions at this time, and will not consider any of the
matters referred to in the deposition in the disposition of
these motions.

The Court finds that there is no dispute as to the
material facts in this case and has concluded therefrom that
the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary * judgment as prayed
for and grants the plaintifffs motion.
The Court has further concluded that the defendants
are not entitled to partial summary judgment and denies their
motion.
The factual situation is nearly identical to the fact
situation as shown in Carbon County Case No. 14890, Plateau
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry,
et al. , and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion
in that case to show the reasoning of the Court, and the legal
analysis used by the Court, in reaching its decision in this
case.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare
a formal judgment in accordance with this decision.
DATED this

/ / ^

day of April, 1988.

BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge
/

2

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

l
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
>
Delaware Corporation, and
)
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,]

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

plaintiffs,
vs .
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.

]
]
]
]
)
)
]
]
]
j

Civil NO. 14890

)

The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed in light of the parties course of performance;
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legal
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher

rate of royalty after

the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period;
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the
3oard of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff,
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board.
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.
-2-

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts.

There is no dispute as to the fact

that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15,
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher, . . . B
That the lease was on a standard form provided by
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C
per ton.

The payment was received and retained by the State

without question or objection throughout the audit period and
prior thereto from sometime in 1965.

The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plateau and their predecessors in interest

filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15c per ton and
left the other column blank.
After the term of the lease had expired, December
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook,
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.

The

audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of
1985.
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed.

Based upon

the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales
Value of coal removed.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
-4-

the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
The royalty provision is divided into two parts.
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive
determination and provides for 15$ per ton on coal produced
from the leased premises.
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and
provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at the

beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?
-5-

For these reasons, the Court has concluded that
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors
necessary for self-execution could not independently be
ascertained by either party.
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require
some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment.
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty
under sub-paragraph (a).
Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a
different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted
construction to an ambiguous lease provision.
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
-6-

ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based
upon 15C a ton.

If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were

going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did
not do.

By their conduct and failure to perform this duty,

they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the
acceptable royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon,
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not
have done had they known that the defendants were going to
-7-

insist upon the 8% of value provision.

The great injustice

that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity
under the State Lease.
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effecc on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from, applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms ic feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result.
The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent
-3-

payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED t h i s

^ K ^ d a y

of Feb r u a r y ,

1988

BOYD BUNNELL, D ^ f f r i c t
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J u dge

l\ddcr\ciLu^ &

Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682)
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:' (801) 521-3200
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY;
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847
Honorable Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Plaintiff having moved for Partial Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court
having issued its decision granting the Motion of plaintiff and

denying the Motion of defendants, and good and sufficient cause
appearing therefore, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES:
1.

Defendants are not entitled to recover from

plaintiff any royalty amounts calculated at any rate higher
than 15^ per ton of coal produced from State Coal Lease
No. ML-22603 during the period from 1979 through 1985.
2.

Interest due on any delinquent royalties payable

under State Coal Lease No. ML-22603 only begins to accrue when
demand for payment of the delinquent royalties is made, and
then accrues at the statutory legal rate of interest.
3.

The parties hereto shall bear their respective

costs and attorneys' fees.
DATED this

3rd

day of

August

1988.

BY THE COURT:

I si

BOYD BUNNELL

Boyd Bunnell
District Judge

0851j
DLJ
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Addendum 3

Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682)
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: . (801) 521-3200
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs .
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY;
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847
Honorable Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Plaintiff, having moved for Partial Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court
having considered the Uncontroverted Facts and Exhibits as set

forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and having considered each
party's Memoranda of Legal Points and Authorities, and now
being well advised in the premises, hereby enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Uncontroverted Facts set forth in the Pre-trial
Order are accepted by the Court as established for purposes of
this case.

Based upon said Pre-trial Order the Court makes the

following findings of fact:
1.

Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors

in interest mined coal under State Mineral Lease No. 22603 (the
"Lease") during the period from 1979 through 1985.
2.

The Lease was on a standard form prepared by the

State Land Board.
3.

Article III of the Lease provides in pertinent

part as follows:
The Lessee, in consideration of the
granting of the rights and privileges
aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as
follows:
SECOND:. To pay Lessor quarterly, on or
before the 15th day of the month succeeding
each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15?f per ton of
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the

-2-

leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the
beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character
under coal leases issued by the United
States at that time,
whichever is higher, . . .
4.

The state provided Trail Mountain Coal Company

and its predecessors with a form for reporting coal production
and royalties under the lease.
calculating royalties.

The form has two columns for

One column is headed gf/T Basis and the

other is headed Percentage Basis.
5.

Throughout the period of mining, Trail Mountain

Coal Company and its predecessors filed the reporting form on a
quarterly basis with the State of Utah.

Trail Mountain Coal

Company and its predecessors calculated royalties by filling in
the column on the form labeled d/Ton

Basis, and paid the amount

of royalty shown to be due under that column at 15jf per ton of
coal produced.

The other column, labeled Percentage Basis, was

left blank on each form.
6.

Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors

made royalty payments to the State of Utah for each quarter of
the years 1979 through 1985 during which coal was produced, on
the basis of 15^5 per ton, as calculated on the reporting form.

-3-

7.

Each reporting form and each royalty payment was

received and retained by the State without question or
objection.
8.

At various times prior to and during the period

of mining, there was written and verbal correspondence between
the State of Utah and Trail Mountain Coal Company or its
predecessors, regarding the royalty provision of the Lease and
the amounts payable thereunder,
9.

The conduct of the Lessor and the Lessees under

the Lease over a period of years shows that they chose not to
apply subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision, and to
calculate the royalty under subparagraph (a).
10.

In approximately March of 1985, the State

undertook, for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.
11.

On or about October 15, 1985, the State provided

Trail Mountain Coal Company with a copy of the royalty audit,
and demanded payment for royalties it alleged to be delinquent.
12.

It was the conclusion of the audit that Trail

Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors should have been
paying royalties at the rate of 8% of the value of coal
removed.

Based upon the audit, the State made demand upon

Trail Mountain Coal Company for the payment of an additional
$5,222,197.20 for delinquent royalties, interest and penalties.
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13.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

Court now enters its Conclusions of Law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The royalty provision contained in Article III,

subparagraph (b) of the Lease, is ambiguous.
2.

Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed

against the State.
3.

The alternate royalty provision of subparagraph

(b) of the Lease is not self-executing so as to create a legal
obligation on the Lessee.
4.

Some affirmative action on the State's part other

than a retroactive audit was required to bring the alternate
royalty provision into an enforceable position.
5.

The Lease should be enforced in accordance with

the parties interpretation and course of conduct.
6.

Since the parties, by an established course of

conduct for many years, and by their interpretation of the
Lease, adopted a construction of the Lease that provided for
payment of royalties at the rate of 15^ per ton, the State is
now precluded from asserting a different construction of the
Lease retroactively.
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7.

Since the State took no sufficient or positive

action to establish the construction of the ambiguous Lease
provision which the State now asserts, the State is precluded
from doing so retroactively.
8.

The above Conclusions of Law are sufficient to

support a judgment granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

Although it is not necessary for the Court

to go further, the Court also makes the following Conclusions
of Law.
9.

The State acted in a proprietary capacity in

entering into the Lease.
10.

The doctrine of estoppel may be applied against

the State.
11.

The State is estopped from demanding and

collecting royalty payments for coal mined under the Lease in
any amount greater than 15^ per ton for the period from 1979
through 1985.
12.

The State had no right under the Lease to impose

interest, except on delinquent payments of the 15<£ per ton
royalty at the legal rate, or any penalty.
13.

Any interest that may be due on delinquent

payments does not commence to run until demand is made.
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14.

There is no dispute as to the material facts in

this case, and plaintiff is entitled to Partial Summary
Judgment as prayed for.

—

DATED this ^ 7 7 ~day of /sAfsfsr?S*

1988

/^-Boyd^unn^dl, Drs-tfict Judge
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MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION

NO

.,0,

MINERAL LEASE N O .

1

ftdcbdim /

GRANT: Sc Dl

Utah State

Lease for

"

COAL
THIS INDENTURE OF I EASE A N D AGREEMENT entered into in duplicate this *.t-Il
day of
_ 1C >rUSry
by and Herueen the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and
1

j

0

I.ALC0L: II. llciCIKKo:
\??2 South Hrin S t r e e t
bait Li»-c C U y , Utah 84)01

party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
>X ITNESSETH. That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be pail and the co\enants to be observe' by the Leasee, as herrimfter set forth, does hereby grant ind lease to the Le see the exclusive nehr and p'lvile^e to mine, remove, a«"d dispo«e of a'l of the
said minerals in, upon, or under the following? described tract of land situited in

A l l of t c c L L e n Ti i -I • - n - : (Z ) , T«r » f .1
S i : . ( ) K r s . , ±...
L ' o . c :*'•>< ,

1

CT^

!• vet ' m > ('7)

Coun ,, State of Utah, to-wit

Ecu -I , •'.'

r

, 4
c o n n nm«: a ton! of
- -r..U
j e s S | together with the ncht to use and occupy so much of th* surface of said land as
a c f f ^ m i re o r
rmy be required for ill purpo es reasomblv incident to the minmr, removil, a n ! dt pos il of said minerals, ace ^rdmg to the provisions of this
lease, for the pen->d endni. ten years after the first diy of January next succeeding the date hereof and as long thernf er as 'ltd minerals miy
be rroduced in c m m t M i l ijuannties frc m said l m J s or Lessee sh«l! continue to mike the pavrnents recuitcd b, Article III hereof, upon
condition thit at the c n i of rath rv enty {20) y c r period succeeding the first diy cf the yeir in which this I d s ; is i^ led, such readjustment
of terms and conditions may be m ide is the lessor ma, determine to be ne^essarv m the interest of the St ite

ARTICLE

I

This lease is printed subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the la AS of t l e Snte of Utnh ind existing rules and regulations
and such operating rules and regulations as may be he cafter approved and adopted b> th- Stale Lind Board

ARTICLE f7
This lease covers only the mining, removal, ind disrxvil of the minerals specifird in this lease, bu* the Lessee shall promptly notify the
the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals e\«.rr'mq those enumeritc I herein
ARTICLE III
The Lessee, in consideration of the grantm* of the nght-> ind privileges aforesnd, hereby covenints and aprees as follows:
TIRST- To piy to the Lessor as rennl for tne land covered by this leise the sum of fifty (50) cents per icre per annum All such annual
piyments of rental shall be made in advance c>iy the 2nd diy cf January of e-.Ji year, except the
1 71; J
__
on the execution of this lease All rental* shall be credited agnnst royalties for the year in which they accrue

rental which is payable

SFCOND* T o pa> to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
( a ) at the rate of 15<* per ton of 2000 lbs of io.il product d from the h i v d pirmncs and sold or otherwise disposed of, or
(b) at the rite prevailing, at the begtntmir of the quarter for w h u h payment is being made, for federal lessees of land of similar character under coaTTeases issued by the United State* at tint time,
whichever is higher, an 1, commencing with the >ear bcpnnmn the January 1 following two >eirs from the d re hereof, to p»y annual roya'ty
of at least Si 0C multiplied by the number of acres h ~ u b , leised recatdless of actual production, provided thit Lessor may, at any time at'er
the tenth anniversary elate hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50*/e

If the coal produced from
product only, provided Les«ee
ascertained and complies with
coal originating from the leased

the leased premises Is washed before sale or other disposition by Lessee, Lessee may pty royalty on the washed
maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased pren.'.es can be
all reputations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed
premises.

THIRD: T O prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which
the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require.
FOURTH: To keep at tire mine office dear, accurate and detailed mans on tracing cloth, en a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch,
of the workings in e.-nh section of the leased lands and on the lands adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land corner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer and all maps certified
to by him.
FIFTH: Not to fence or otherwise make inaccessihe to stock any watering place on the premises without first obtaining the written consent
of Les*or, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface wafer available or capable of being made available for domestic
or irrigation use.
SIXTH: Not to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained.

ARTICLE IV
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease:
FIRST: 7K- rinhi to permit for joint or several use such cerements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may
be necessarv or appropriate to the working cf these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits
or for other use.
SFCON'P: The rir'"t t> ir-r. le-se, <c!l, or otherwise d it, pose of the surface of said land:, or any part thereof, under existing Stare laws
or laws hereafter er •-' I, irr -.far as said surface is not necessary for the I.esee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leased substances therein, an J to lc:i i e mineral depos-.t-, c'hsr tfnn those Ira.-ed herelv, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's right* herein granted.

ARTICLE V
I Tpon f:r!tir" or icfn il of the lr rr to accept the readjustment of term": and conditions demanded by the Lesfor at thr end of any twentyyear period, SULII failure \-r refrsal '.hall work a forfeiture of the lease and the fame shall be canceled.

ARTICLE VJ
In ea'-e of i_\-pira'ion. forfeiture, surrrn.Icr o: other terrnoaticn cf thi- lea?e, all underground timbering supports, shaft lininrr. rails and
other in'-taltarii rv- nere'-.-rv f >r the support of m lcr<;-ound workings of any minc r . and all rails or head frames and all instillations which
cannot be remove! v. ithou: prrrr.ancnt imury to the p-cmi.-cs and all con^tru- ticn and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation
for anv mine-, up n or in •••. *::d land- shall he and remain a part of the realrv nnd shall revert to the Lessor without further consideration or
compeir-ation ;<r.A -hall he left hv th • l v ce in the lands.
AH person-1 pr-;cr»v of ].r • <-ce located within or upon the said land*, and all build,nr-, machinery, equipment and tools (other than
in• talbtions to rv;<;r"- rhr property of l.r^.'r a above provided), shall b<* and remain the property of Lessee and Lessr* <hall he entitled
and m?'-', within six (' ) months a'tcr *uch expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of sai.l lease, or within r uch extension
time as mav be gram* ! bv lessor, remove from thr s.-jd lands su.h personal property arid improvements, other than those items which
to remain the property :f the I e s••>- as n h n c provided.

the
to,
of
are

Leasee sh ••!!, i:p >n terrmrv t- ->n, of this Ic.-.se or nK-ndonmrnr of t!-.e leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such
part of the mine opvr.it,;:s »n th- prcmi'cs- as Les'.or shall request be sealed.

ARTICLE Vll
It sh.il! \x the responsibility of the Lessee xo slope the sidrs of all operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45° or to
erect » barrier arom-d -r h operation a- thr State Land Hoard may require. Such sloping or fencing shall become n normal part of the operation of the lease so r.s to Irvf pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard.

ARTICLE VIII
Lessee shall not *eM cr otherwise drspose of
mission. Ufxm termination of this lease for any
Lessor as an appurtenance to the leajed premises,
at Lessee's acquisition costs, provided that Lessor
days after receipt thereof.

anv water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written perreason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall revert to the
and all such rights acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase
shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it doe< not accept the same within thirty

ARTICLE IX
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns of the Lessee.

ARTICLE X
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor and upon payment of all
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable to the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preservation of the working-? in such order and condition as to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises.

ARTICLE XI
Lessor, its olfice" and agent*-, shall have the right at all times to go in and upon the leased lands and premises, during the term of said
lease to inspect thr work done and the progress thereof on said lands and the products obtained therefrom, and to post any notices on the
said land that it may deem fit and proper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records
pertaining to operations under this lease, and to make copies of and extracts from the same, if desired.
ARTICLE XII
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that in the event the State is hereafter divested of such
title, the Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by the Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entited to or claim any refund of rentals
or royalties or other monies theretofcre paid to the Lessor.
ARTICLE XJfJ

STATE OF UTAH
STATE LAND BOARD

Dv

.,-./-//W ^^-test&qsi

DIRECTOR
tFSSOU

^^?^^t!^^2^^^^5t
LESSEE

STATE OF UTAH

I-

COUNTY OF
On the

Jay of

LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
19

, personally appeared befurr me

the signer of rhr above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
Given under my hand and seal this

executed the same.

clay of

19

My commi^iim Expires:

Notary Public, residing at:

STATE OF UTAH

LESSEE'? CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

COUNTY OF
On the

day of

19

, personally appeared l>eforc me

,

who being duly sworn did say that he is an officer of

anJ that said instrument was signed

in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and paid

„

acknowl-

edged to me th.it said corporation executed the same.

Given under my hand and seal this

day of

19.........

My commission Expires:

Nctary Public, residing at:

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)-

On the ..J/S-*
day of ./J. ^U.. A
19..:...:., personally appeared before me Max C. Gardner, who bring by me duly sworn
did lay that he is the Director of the State Land Board cf the State of Utah and that said instrument was sipned in behalf of said Board by
rrsolution of the Board, and said Max C. Gardner acknowledged to me that said Board executed the same in behalf of the State of Utah.

Given under my hand and seal this

day of —*-.J/!.J.X'*&.'-U:JZL

19:1

1

^Z-.^LJJL.Z^.
My commission Expires:

Notary Public, reiiding at:

,
X

i

n i

) , . ^ WO
t- i

l J/•

4*»*

'i'

/>'/
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SCHEDULE I

p. 1 of 3

Federal Coal Leases Issued In Utah
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985
Date

Lease No.

Lessee

Location

1-U79

U28297

Coastal States

T21S, R5E.
T22S, R5E.

Sec 32. 33
Sec 4, 5. 7.
8. 17. 18

3-1-79

U32083

Kaiser Coal

T14S. R14E, Sec 6, 8, 17

Seam(s)
Upper Hiawatha

Sunnyslde

Royalty
Rate
11.68X

9.20X

Hiawatha. Bear Canyon
Blind Canyon

12.50X

T12S. R9E, Sec 25. 26
T12S. R10E, Sec 28-30

Kenllworth. Castlegate D,B,A
Sub-seam 1, 2, & 3

10.40X

Trail Mtn Coal

T17S. R6E.

Sec 25

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon,
Hiawatha, Upper Hiawatha

8.00X

U08319,#3

Beaver Creek

T13S. R7E.

Sec 13

Haley Bed

5.00X

4-1-80

U37045

Cyprus Western

T15S, R8E,

Sec 5-8

Third Bed

8.00X

10-1-81

U47080

Coastal States

T21S, R4E,
T21S. R5E,

Sec 25. 36
Sec 30

Upper Hiawatha

8.00X

10-1-81

U47978

Utah Power & Lt T17S. R7E,
T18S, R7E.

Sec 27-34
Sec 4,5

Hiawatha
BlInd Canyon

8.00X

10-1-81

U47979

Utah Power & Lt T16S. R7E,
T17S. R7E,

Sec 34
Sec 3. 4

BlInd Canyon
Hiawatha

8.00X

12-1-81

U47974

Kanawha Hocking

Sec 3. 9. 10. 15,16

O'Conner, Hiawatha,
Lower O'Conner

8.00X

10-31-79 U02664,#2

Utah Power & Lt T17S, R7E,

12-1-79

U25683

Blackhawk Coal

1-18-80

U82996.02

3-26-80

T13S, R7E.

Sec 14

SCHEDULE I

p. 2 of 3

Federal Coal Leases Issued In Utah
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985
Oate

Lease No.

Seam(s)

Location

Lessee

Royalty
Rate

12-1-81

U47975

Kanawha Hocking

T13S. R7E,

Sec 1-3, 11-14,
23, 24

Lower O'Conner, Hiawatha,
Bob Wright, Castlegate A

12-1-81

U53159

Beaver Creek

T13S, R7E,
T13S, R8E,

Sec 13, 24
Sec 19

Hiawatha

12-1-81

U07958

Emery Energy

T21S, R7E,
T22S, R7E,

Sec 31, 33
Sec 4-8. 17, 18

No Data
Mancos-Ferron Member

2-1-82

U01362

Utah Power & Lt

T36S,
T36S,
T37S.
T37S.
T38S,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

9-1-82

U50722

Sunedco Coal

T13S. R U E , Sec 12. 13

Rock Canyon, GlIson

8.00X

10-1-82

U47977

Utah Power & Lt

T16S, R7E,

Sec 32

Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

8.00%

11-1-82

U47973

Blshopgate Coal

T12S, R7E,

Sec 30

No Data

8.00%

3-1-83

U49332

W K Minerals

T17S, R6E,

Sec 25, 26, 35

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon,
Hiawatha

8,00%

4-1-83

U05146

Mtn States Res.

T24S, R5E,

Sec 17-21. 28

Iv1e Bed

8.00%

7-1-83

U50044

Consol Coal 50%
Chevron 50%

T22S. R6E,

Sec 22

I, J. C. & D

8.00%

12-1-83

U52341

AMCA Coal

T13S, R11E, Sec 9

Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon,
Gllson Bed, Kenllworth,
Royal Blue

8.00%

R2E,
R3E,
R2E,
R3E,
R3Ef

13, 14. 23-26, 35 Alvey, Rees, Chrlstensen
19. 30, 31
1, 11-14. 24, 25
5-7, 18. 19, 27-31
3-7, 8. 9, 17

8.001
8.00%
8.00%
8.00%

SCHEDULE I

p. 3 of 3

Federal Coal Leases Issued 1n Utah
January 1, 1979 to December 31. 1985
Date
10-1-85

Lease No.
U51923

Lessee
U S Fuel

Location
T15S, R8E, Sec 20

Seam(s)
Hiawatha. 2nd & 3rd. Watis,
Tank

Royalty
Rate
8.00X

SCHEDULE II

1 of 5

Federal Leases 1n Utah Adjusted During the Audit Period
January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1985
Pre-Adjusted
Royalty

Post-Adjusted
Royalty

Date
Adj.

Lease No.

—79

SL058575

Nevada Electric

T39S, R5W. Sec 19

Smlrl

15tf/Ton

OX

-1-79

SL048223

Utah Power & Lt

T36S, R2E, Sec 12

Alvey

15^/Ton

8X

-1-79

SL050133

Utah Power & Lt

T17S, R7E. Sec 24

Bear Canyon, Hiawatha

15^/Ton

OX

-1-79

SL051221

Utah Power 8, Lt

T16S. R7E. Sec 28

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon,
Hiawatha

15^/Ton

8X

-1-79

SL070645

McKlnnon Trust

T17S. R7E. Sec 4-5. 0-10. 15-17 Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

15^/Ton

OX

-1-79

SL071561

Fulton Ceaser

T3f>S, R2W. Sec 23

Henderson

lr>//Ton

OX

-1-79

U014275

Utah Power b Lt

16S, R7E, Sec 28

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon
Hiawatha

ISf/Ton

OX

-1-79

U024317

Utah Power I Lt

T16S. R7E, Sec 20. 21

Hiawatha

lr>//Ton

OX

-1-79

U02664

Utah Power h Lt

T17S, R7E, Sec 13-14, 23-24. 2f>

Hiawatha. Rear Canyon,
BlInd Canyon

lfi//Ton

OX

-1-79

U06039

Utah Power h Lt

T16S. R7E, Sec 19-20, 29-30

No Data

1rs?/Ton

OX

-1-79

SL049042

A.M. Rassmussen

T40S. ROW. Sec 32

Upper Meadow Brook

15//Ton

OX

-1-79

SL066116

Utah Power h Lt

T17S. R7E. Sec 11-12. 14

Blind Canyon, Bear Canyon
Hiawatha

15^/Ton

OX

-1-79

U010581

AMCA Coal

T13S. RITE, Sec 5-9. 17

Upper Sunnyslde, Abek Canyon. Fish
Creek. Gllson Bed, Kenllworth,
Royal Blue, Castlegate B & A
Aberdeen

15^/Ton

OX

Lessee

Seam(s)

Location
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Lessee
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Location

Pre-Adjustcd
Royal ty

Post-Adjusted
RoyALLy

M*J_L

lease No.

-1-79

U25485

Qlackhavk Coal

-1-79

SL050619

King Cannel Coal T39S, R9W, Sec 24-26

Upper Bed

15^/Ton

87.

-1-80

SL050641

General Explor.

Castlegate M A"

15tf/Ton

87.

-1-80

U022918

Charles Kingston T17S, R7E, Sec 3

Upper Bed, Bear Canyon,
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

15tf/Ton

8%

-1-80

U024316

C O . P . Coal

T16S, R7E. Sec 13, 14

No Data

15^/Ton

87.

-1-80

U024318

C O . P . Coal

T16S, R7E, Sec 26

No Data

15^/Ton

87.

-1-81

U024814

Brlgham Young U. T13S, R9E, Sec 7

Castlegate A, Spring Canyon,
Sub-seam 3

15^/Ton

8X

-1-81

U08606

Brlgham Young U. T13S, ROE. Sec 1

Aberdeen

15^/Ton

87.

-4-81

U25484

Blackhawk Coal

T12S, R9E, Sec 31

Castlegate A, B, Kenllworth
Sub-seam 1 , 2 , 3

15tf/Ton

87.

-1-81

SL029093

Blackhawk Coal

T13S, R9E, Sec 3
T12S. R9E, Sec 26-28

Kenl1 worth
Castlegate A, B, C, D, Aberdeen,
Sub-seam 2, 3

15^/Ton

8%

-1-81

U0S8184

Blackhawk Coal

T12S. R9E, Sec 33
T13S. R9E, Sec 3-5

Castlegate A, B, 0
Aberdeen, Sub-seam 1, 2, 3,
Kenl1 worth

12.5^/Ton

or.

-1-81

U024319

Utah Power & Lt

T16S, R7E, Sec 27, 28, 33, 34

Blind Canyon, Hiawatha
Bear Canyon

15^/Ton

87.

T12S. R9E, Sec 30. 31

T14S, R6E, Sec 25

Castlegate A, B, D, Sub-seam 1,2,3, 12.5jf/Ton
Kenllworth, Aberdeen

nx
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Date
Adj.

Lease No.

-1-82

U1362

Utah Power & Lt

T36S, R2E, Sec 13. 14
No Data
T37S, R2E. Sec 1, 14. 24
No Data
T37S. R3E, Sec 5-7. 18-19. 27. 31 Alvey Coal 20

-1-82

U026583

U.S. Fuels

T15S. R7E. Sec 13. 14. 25

Blackhawk Coal
-1-82

SL04G652

-1-82

SL063011

-1-82

U082996

-1-82

Seam(s)

Location

Lessee

Pre-Adjusted
Royalty

Post-Adjusted
Roya1ty

25?/Ton

8X

No Data

1r>ff/Ton

8%

T12S. R10E, Sec 33. 34
T13S. R10E. Sec 3

Kenl1 worth
Castlegate A. B. C. D

15//Ton

flX

Wasatch Coal

T13S. R8E, Sec 7. 8. 17. 18

Castlegate A. Hiawatha, Gordon Bed,
No. 1 Seam, Upper Beds

15^/Ton

8X

Trail Mtn. Coal

T17S, R6E. Sec 25

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon
Hiawatha. Upper Hiawatha

15^/Ton

8X

U044025

Coop. Security

T17S, R7E, Sec 27

Hiawatha

15^/Ton

BX

-8-83

SL025431

U.S. Fuels

T15S,
T15S.
T16S.
T16S,

No Data
No Data
Upper Bed
Hiawatha

15^/Ton

8X

-8-82

U61048

Intermtn. Power

T16S, R7E. Sec 1. 12

Hiawatha. Blind Canyon.
Bear Canyon

15^/Ton

87.

-1-83

SL050638

G.H. Frandsen

"E" - Upper Alvey

15^/Ton

8%

Smlrl

15^/Ton

8%

Smlrl

15^/Ton

8%

R7E.
R8E.
R7E.
R8E,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

36
31
1. 12
5-8

T16S, R8E. Sec 6-8
T35S, R1E, Sec 8
-1-83

-1-83

SL060745

SL060746

Nevada Electric

Nevada Electric

T39S,
T39S,
T39S,
T40S,

R5W,
R6W,
R5W.
R5W,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

7, 17-20. 29
11-14
29. 32. 33
4. 5
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Date

AdJL

Lease No.

Seam(s)

Location

Lessee

Pre-Adjusted
Royalty

Post-Adjusted
Roya1ty

3-1-83

U065012

Nevada Electric

T39S, R5W, Sec 30, 31
T39S, R6W, Sec 25

Smlrl

15y7Ton

8X

3-1-83

U083072

Nevada Electric

T39S. R6W, Sec 14, 23. 26

Smlrl

15^/Ton

8%

4-1-83

U5146

Mtn. States Res.

Mancos-Ferron Member

25^/Ton

8X

Smlrl

15tf/Ton

8X

Smlrl

15tf/Ton

8X

Above Waltls Bed
Third Bed, Second Bed, Waltls,
Hiawatha

15tf/Ton

8X

T40S. R5W, Sec 8
T24S, R5E, Sec 17-21, 28
5-1-83

U0101153

Nevada Electric
T40S, R5W, Sec 17, 19, 20, 29

5-1-83

*

U098705

Nevada Electric
T39S,
T40S,
T15S.
T15S.

R6W,
R6W.
R8E,
R7E,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

26, 27, 34. 35
3-5, 8-10
7, 8
1, 12-13

9-4-83

SL031286

Cyprus Western

10-1-83

SL062648

Genwal Coal

T16S. R7E. Sec 5. 6

Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

15^/Ton

8X

1-1-84

U07064

Sunoco Energy

T13S. R12E, Sec 13, 23-26

Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon,
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth

15f/Ton

8X

1-1-84

U067498

Kanawha-Hocking

Upper 0'Conner, Lower 0'Conner

15^/Ton

8X

T13S. R8E, Sec 11. 12

Castlegate A, B, Spring Canyon
Bed Above KenlIworth

lOtf/Ton

8X

T13S. R13E, Sec 18, 19, 30
T14S. R7E. Sec 6. 7
1-21-84

SLO63720

Brlgham Young U.

10-1-84

U083000

Swanton Energy

T40S. R4E, Sec 20, 28, 29, 33.

H, I, J, Kl, K2, L, M, N, 0

15tf/Ton

8X

11-1-84

SL064507

Nevada Electric

T39S, R6W, Sec 13, 24

Smlrl

20^/Ton

8X

12-1-84

U083005

Swanton Energy

T40S, R4Ef Sec 9

H, I, Jt Kl, K2, L, M t N t 0

15^/Ton

8X
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Date
Adj.

Lease No.

*

3-1-85

U0140770

Nevada Electric

T40S, R5W, Sec 24-27, 34

Smlrl

*

6-1-85

U0105404

Nevada Electric

T40S, R5W, Sec 14, 23-27

Smlrl

*

6-1-85

U098774

Nevada Electric

T40S, R4W, Sec 7, 18
T40S, R4-2W, Sec 8, 9

Smlrl

*

6-6-85

U098775

Nevada Electric

T40S, R4-2W, Sec 17, 18
T40S, R5W, Sec 13

Smlrl

* 10-1-85

U0115938

Nevada Electric

T39S, R4W, Sec 33

Smlrl, Bald Knoll

11-1-85

U0118366

Hlko Bell

Lessee

Searo(s)

Location

T40S, R4W, Sec 4-8
B. Basil, C, A-2, A-l
T42S, R3E, Sec 13-15
11-1-85

U27835

Swanton Energy

H, I, J, Kl, K2, L, M, Nt
T40S, R3E, Sec 1

12-1-85

U146654

Hlko Bell

B, Basil, C, A-2, A-l
T42S. R3E, Sec 25-27, 35

^The readjustment on these leases w a s appealed to the BLM.
T h e r e a d j u s t m e n t s w e r e upheld.
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Issue
Date

Lease No.

9-1-25

SL027304

Lessee

Location

Seam(s)

Audit Period
Royalty Rate

AMCA Coal

T13S, R U E , Sec 7, 18

Aberdeen, Lower Sunnyslde, Upper
Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, Gil son.
Royal Blue, Castlegate A, B

15^/Ton

H-21-30 SL048442

Blackhawk Coal

T13S. R10E, Sec 1, 3-4, 10-12

Lower Sunnyslde, Kenllworth
Royal Blue, Castlegate A, C

15^/Ton

12-21-30 U051511

R.W. Humphreys

T13S, R10E, Sec 11

D, Kenllworth, Ce, B, A

15^/Ton

Sunedco Coal

T13S. R U E , Sec 12. 13

Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon, Gil son

15^/Ton

Castlegate A, Candland, Upper Beds

15^/Ton

Bob Wright

150/Ton

Upper Hiawatha

15^/Ton

1-4-35

SL051279

T13S, R12E, Sec 7, 8. 17, 18
11-17-38 SL05065&
3-17-39

Genwal Coal

T14S, R6E, Sec 13

Kanawha-Hocking

SL062605

9-H-41

SL062583

Coastal States

T13S,
T14S,
T21S,
T21S,
T22S,
T22S,

R7E,
R7E,
R4E,
R5E,
R4E,
R5E,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

27, 34
3, 10
36
31
1. 12
6, 7

2-3-45

SL064900

Utah Power & Lt

T17S. R7E, Sec 22

Grimes Wash, Bear Canyon,
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

17.5^/Ton

1-24-46

SL064903

Beaver Creek

T16S, R7E, Sec 16

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon,
Hiawatha

15^/Ton

10-4-46

SL064607

Utah Power & Lt

T17S, R7E, Sec 2, 3, 10

Lower Hiawatha, Hiawatha
Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon

17.5^/Ton
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Issue
Date

Lease No.

Seam(s)

Location

Lessee

Audit Period
Royalty Rate

U.S. Fuels

T15S, R7E, Sec 25, 26
T16S, R7E, Sec 1, 12, 13
T16S, R8E, Sec 7, 18-20

No Data
No Data
Upper Bed, Bear Canyon, Hiawatha

17.5tf/Ton

4-1-50 SL069291

Kaiser Coal

T16S, R14E, Sec 24-26, 35

Sunnyside Bed, Upper Sunnyside,
Lower Sunnyside

15tf/Ton

9-1-50 SL071737

Blackhawk Coal

T12S, R9E, Sec 26-29

Castlegate A, B, C, D,
Sub-seam 1 , 2 , 3

12.5*/Ton

6-1-51

Kaiser Coal

T14S, R U E , Sec 10-14, 24

Upper Sunnyside, Lower Sunnyside

15^/Ton

6-1-52 U05067

Sunedco Coal

T U S . R U E , Sec 4, 9

Lower Sunnyside, Rock Canyon,
Fish Creek, Gilson Bed, Kenllworth
Royal Blue

15tf/ton

7-1-52

Kaiser Coal

T U S . R U E , Sec 19, 20. 28-31, 33 Lower Sunnyside

15^/Ton

2-1-55 U014217

Kaiser Coal

T16S, R14E, Sec 25
T16S, R15E, Sec 30, 31

Sunnyside Bed, Upper Sunnyside,
Lower Sunnyside

15^/Ton

2-1-55 U014218

Kaiser Coal

T16S, R14E, Sec 12

Sunnyside Bed. Upper Sunnyside,
Lower Sunnyside

15^/Ton

9-1-56

Kanawha-Hocking

TUS,
TUS,
T14S,
T14S,

Upper O'Conner, Lower O'Conner

150/Ton

Blackhawk Coal

T U S , R8E, Sec 35

Bob Wright. Castlegate A

12.5*/Ton

H-l-49

SL069985

SL068754

U02785

U017354

6-1-57 U019524

R6E,
R7E,
R6E,
R7E,

Sec
Sec
Sec
Sec

36
31
1
6

i.
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Audit Period
Royalty Rate

ue
e
57

Lease No.
U07746

Sunoco Energy

T13S. R12E. Sec 10, 11, 14, 15,
22, 23

Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon,
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth

15^/Ton

58

U38727

Nevada Electric

T16S, R7E, Sec 24, 25

Hiawatha, Bear Canyon

15^/Ton

58

U020668

Blackhawk Coal

T16S, R7E, Sec 25
T16S, R8E, Sec 30, 31

Hiawatha

15tf/Ton

58

U46484

Nevada Electric

T16S. R7E, Sec 10-14

Hiawatha

15tf/Ton

60

U039706

Kaiser Coal

T13S, R13E. Sec 33-35
T M S , R13E, Sec 3-5, 9,10

Lower Sunnyslde

15//Ton

61

U020641

Kanawha-Hocking

T M S . R7E, Sec 17, 20, 21

Upper Beds

15?7Ton

62

U020305

Coastal States

T13S. R6E, Sec 13. M , 23-26

Upper O'Conner, Lower 0'Conner

15//Ton

62

U053995

Coastal States

T21S, R5E. Sec 26

Upper Hiawatha

15//Ton

62

U062453

Coastal States

T21S. R5E. Sec 20. 29, 32. 33

Upper Hiawatha

15</Ton

62

U073033

Consolldatlon

T23S, R6E. Sec 4-5, 0-9. 17.
19-20

M M

15^/Ton

62

UO7304O

Consolldatlon

T23S, R6E, Sec 20-21, 20-33

No Data

15^/Ton

62

U073041

Consolidation

T24S, R6E, Sec 5-7
T24S, R5E, Sec 1, 12

Unnamed

15f/Ton

62

U089096

Sunoco Energy

T13S, R12E, Sec 0, 17

Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth

15^/Ton

Lessee

Seam(s)

Location

C

Coal Bed
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Audit Period
Royalty Rate

Issue
Date

Lease No.

-2-62

U090231

Consolidation

T24S, R5E, Sec 13, 14, 23. 25,
26, 35

"A" Coal Bed

15^/Ton

-1-62

U092147

Sunoco Energy

T13S, R12E, Sec 17, 20, 21

Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon
Fish Creek, Gllson, Kenllworth

15tf/Ton

.1-64

U073120

Kanawha-Hocking

T13S, R6E, Sec 13, 14, 24

Upper O'Conner, Lower 01Conner

15^/Ton

-1-64

U084923

McKlnnon Trust

T17S, R7E, Sec 4-7, 17, 18

Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

15tf/Ton

•1-64

U084924

McKlnnon Trust

T17S, R6E. Sec 1, 12, 13

No Data

15^/Ton

-1-64

U0142235

Coastal States

T13S, R6E, Sec 11, 14

Upper 0'Conner, Lower 0'Conner

15^/Ton

-1-65

U0101213

Consolidation

T23S, R5E, Sec 12, 13
T23S, R6Ef Sec 6, 7

3 Unnamed
I, C, D, A

17.5tf/Ton

-1-65

U0101214

Consolidation

T23S, R5E, Sec 24. 25

Lower A, Upper C, Upper I,
Middle F. Lower C

17.5tf/Ton

-1-65

U0101215

ConsolIdatlon

No Data

17.5tf/Ton

No Data

17.5?/Ton

«A„

17.5tf/Ton

Upper O'Conner, Lower O'Conner

17.5^/Ton

Kenilworth, Castlegate A, B, C. D

17.5^/Ton

Castlegate A, B, C. D, Kenllworth

17.5^/Ton

Lessee

Seam(s)

Location

T23S. R6E, Sec 19, 30, 31
T24S, R5E, Sec 3
-1-65

UOI01217

Consolidation
T24S, R5E, Sec 23

-1-65

U0101218

Consolidation
T23S, R5E, Sec 26. 34, 35

-1-65

U044076

Coastal States
T13S. R6E, Sec 26, 27, 34. 35

-1-65

U0146345

Blackhawk Coal
T12S, R10E, Sec 33-35

-8-66

U0148779

Blackhawk Coal
T12S. R10E. Sec 26, 27
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Issue
Date

Lease No.

-1-67

U1358

Utah Power & Lt T17S. R7E, Sec 22, 27

Hiawatha, Bear Canyon,
Blind Canyon

-1-67

U2810

Smith Holladay

T16S. R7E, Sec 28

Bear Canyon, Blind Canyon,
Hiawatha

-1-70 U8319 HI

Beaver Creek

T13S, R8E, Sec 13

Castlegate A

-1-70

U5287

Consolidation

T22S, R6E. Sec 19. 20. 29

No Data

-1-70

U7653

Carroll County

T16S, R7E, Sec 31

No Data

-1-70

U7949

Getty Minerals

T15S. R8Ef Sec 17

Tank Bed, Waltls Bed, 2nd Bed,
Hiawatha

-1-74

U13097

Getty Minerals

T15S. R7E, Sec 14, 23. 25. 26

Hiawatha, Waltls

-5-37

SL050862

W.A. Land Co.

T16S, R7E. Sec 28, 29. 33

Unkown

Lessee

Seam(s)

Location

Audit Period
Royalty Rate

SCHEDULE IV
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Federal Leases In Utah Eligible for Adjustment During the Audit Period
January lt 1979 to December 31, 1985
But With Appeals Pending as of October, 1987
Issue
Date

Current
Roya1ty

Proposed
Royalty

Adj.
Date

Lease No,

-1-82

U040151

Coop. Security

T17S, R7E, Sec 15-17. 20-22,
27-29

Blind Canyon, Hiawatha
Bear Canyon

3-1-62

15tf/Ton

81

-1-82

U083066

Coop. Security

T17S, R6E. Sec 13, 15, 25
T17S. R7E, Sec 17-20, 29, 30

No Data
Blind Canyon, Hiawatha

3-1-62

15tf/Ton

81

-3-82

SL063058

AMCA Coal

T13S, R U E , Sec 7, 8, 18

Castlegate A, Gllson Bed, Aberdeen, 8-3-42
Lower Sunnyslde, Rock Canyon,
Royal Blue

15tf/Ton

87.

-1-84

SL062966

Kaiser Coal

T14S, R13E, Sec 1, 12, 13, 24,25 Upper Sunnyslde, Lower Sunnyslde
T14S, R14E. Sec 7, 18, 30, 31

11-12-43 15^/Ton

81

-1-84

U0126947

Kaiser Coal

T16S, R14E, Sec 13, 24. 25
T16S, R15E, Sec 19, 29. 30, 31
T17S, R15E, Sec 5, 6

Sunnyslde Bed, Upper Sunnyslde
Lower Sunnyslde

12-1-63

15tf/Ton

81

-1-84

U0126948

Kaiser Coal

T17S, R14E, Sec 1. 12
T17S, R15E. Sec 5-8

Sunnyslde Bed, Upper Sunnyslde
Lower Sunnyslde

12-1-63

15tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U087805

AMCA Coal

T40S, R4E, Sec 31
T41S. R4E, Sec 5, 6

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U087806

AMCA Coal

T41S, R3E, Sec 1, 12

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5^/Ton

81

-1-85

U087807

AMCA Coal

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5f/Ton

81

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5^/Ton

81

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

Lessee

Location

Seam(s)

T41S, R4E, Sec 7
T41S, R4E. Sec 8-10
-1-85

U087828

AMCA Coal
T41S. R4E, Sec 13. 23-25

-1-85

U087833

AMCA Coal
T41S, R4E, Sec 18-21
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Lessee

Location

Seam(s)

Issue
Oate

Current
Royalty

Pre>posed
Roj/alty

Oate

Lease No.

-1-85

U087834

AMCA Coal

T41S. R3E, Sec 10, 11. 14, 15

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U087835

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 13, 24. 25

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U087836

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 12

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

OX

-1-85

U092138

AMCA Coal

T41S, R3E, Sec 19. 30, 31

Chrlstensen, Rees

H-l-65

17.5//Ton

01

-1-85

U092139

AMCA Coal

T41S, R3Ef Sec 6, 7, 18

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U092140

AMCA Coal

T41S. R3E, Sec 3. 4, 9

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

01

-1-85

U092141

AMCA Coal

T41S, R3E. Sec 5. 8, 17

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U092142

AMCA Coal

T42S, R3E, Sec 7, 17, 18

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5^/Ton

01

-1-85

U096486

AMCA Coal

T41S, R4E. Sec 17

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U096494

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 26. 33-35

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5*/Ton

81

-1-85

U096495

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 28-31

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U096496

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 10, 11, 14, 15

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U096497

AMCA Coal

T40S, R3E, Sec 21-23. 27

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81

-1-85

U096509

AMCA Coal

T42S, R3E, Sec 5-8

Chrlstensen, Rees

11-1-65

17.5tf/Ton

81
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